Grant Jeffrey Hall v. Mandy Lynn Hall : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Grant Jeffrey Hall v. Mandy Lynn Hall : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nolan J. Olsen; attorney for appellee.
Steven C. Russell; Affordable Legal Advocates; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Hall v. Hall, No. 20030778 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4553
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
8142 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GRANT JEFFREY HALL, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
MANDY LYNN HALL, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030778-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from a final Order of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Affordable Legal Advocates 
Steven C. Russell 
Attorney for Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone:(801)532-5100 
Nolan J. Olsen 
Attorney for Appellee 
8142 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone: (801)255-7176 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 2 2 2004 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
8142 South State Street 
Midvale,Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GRANT JEFFREY HALL, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
MANDY LYNN HALL, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Case No. 20030778-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from a final Order of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Affordable Legal Advocates 
Steven C. Russell 
Attorney for Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone:(801)532-5100 
Nolan J. Olsen 
Attorney for Appellee 
8142 South State Street 
Midvale,Utah 84047 
Phone: (801)255-7176 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 4 
I. Issue: Whether Mr. Hall has made any showing whatsoever that the District 
Court's findings were not adequately supported by evidence at trial; and, therefore, 
whether such findings supported the District Court's legal determinations 4 
II. Issue: Whether Mr. Hall was denied any due process rights where his counter-
claim put the child support arrearage issue squarely before the District Court 4 
III. Issue: Whether the District Court, in setting aside the child support provisions 
of the 1995 Order Modifying the Divorce Decree, properly determined that 
such order was procured by fraud 4 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
Nature of the Case 5 
Course of Proceedings 6 
Disposition at Trial Court 6 
Relevant Facts 6 
Summary of Argument 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. Mr. Hall fails to show that the trial Court's findings are clearly erroneous 
and therefore insufficient to support the Court's legal determinations 11 
II. Inasmuch as Mr. Hall filed a Counterclaim seeking judgment for child 
support arrearages against Ms. Hall, any issue relating to that claim was 
properly before the trial Court; therefore, Mr. Hall was not denied any 
right of due process 13 
III. The District Court, based on "clear and convincing evidence" before it, 
appropriately set aside the Court's previous Order which was procured 
by misrepresentation or fraud 14 
IV. Ms. Hall is entitled to attorney fees on appeal 16 
CONCLUSION 16 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
SIATUTES 
Utah Code Ann.§30-3-5(3) 5, 15 
Utah Code. Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) 4 
Utah Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60 5, 10,14 
CASES 
Elman v. Elman. 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002) 16 
Gates v. Gates. 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990) 15,16 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.. 322 U.S. 238, (1944) 15 
Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
Kellev v. Kellev. 9 P.3d 171, 186 (Utah App. 2000) 13, 15 
Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) 4, 13,14 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) 13 
Roderick v. Ricks. 54 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002) 5 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) 4, 11,13 
Toscano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 441 F.2d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 1971) 15 
3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Issue: Whether Mr. Hall has made any showing whatsoever that the District Court's 
findings were not adequately supported by evidence at trial; and, therefore, whether such 
findings supported the District Court's legal determinations. 
Standard of Review: "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
II. Issue: Whether Mr. Hall was denied any due process rights where his counterclaim put 
the child support arrearage issue squarely before the District Court. 
Standard of Review: Inasmuch as this issue is raised by Mr. Hall for the first time on 
appeal, this Court should decline to address this claim.1 Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
III. Issue: Whether the District Court, in setting aside the child support provisions of the 1995 
Order Modifying the Divorce Decree, properly determined that such order was procured 
by fraud. 
1
 "[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson 
v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). "This rule 
applies to all claims, including constitutional questions . . . " Id. 
4 
Standard of Review: In reviewing that court's legal conclusions, this court applies a 
correction of error standard. Roderick v. Ricks. 54 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
RULE 60(b). UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(b) Mistakes: inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action (Amended effective April 1, 1998.) (emphasis added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(3) 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves a Petition by Respondent to modify a previous modification Order (the 
1995 Order) of a Divorce Decree and a Counter Petition by Petitioner for a judgment against 
Respondent for $25,000.00 for arrears of support. 
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Course of Proceedings: 
The case was referred for trial by the Commissioner. Trial was held before The 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on August 14, 2003. 
Disposition at Trial Court: 
The District Court granted Ms. Hall's Petition and established child support for a child in 
custody of Ms. Hall's parents and established child support to be paid by Ms. Hall to Mr. Hall for 
the two (2) children in the custody of Mr. Hall. The District Court further denied Mr. Hall's 
Counter Petition for $25,000.00 for arrears in support and, based upon the evidence presented at 
trial, determined that no sums were due from Ms. Hall to Mr. Hall based upon Mr. Hall's fraud 
on the Court and for the further reason that it was undisputed that between June 12, 1995, and 
June 17, 2002, Ms. Hall had no income. 
Relevant Facts: 
1. That a Decree of Divorce was entered on December 2, 1991. (R. 24). 
2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Hall was awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' three children, and Mr. Hall was ordered to pay $450.00 per month for 
the support of the children. (R. 24-26). 
3. That all divorce documents were prepared by Mr. Hall. (R. 205, Transcript p. 19, 
1. 8-10). 
4. That Mr. Hall never had any knowledge of Ms. Hall's income in that he never 
filed income tax returns with Ms. Hall and has not filed personal income tax returns since 1993, 
as far as he could remember. (R. 205, Transcript p. 6,1. 15-25; p. 7,1. 1-9). 
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5. Ms. Hall had a ninth grade education and had a child at age fifteen. (R. 205, 
Transcript p. 18,1. 11-15). 
6. That Ms. Hall has a hearing disability and had basically no income between June 
12, 1995, the date of the modification, until June of 2002, at which time she commenced earning 
$350.00 per month cleaning houses. (R. 178, Transcript p. 7,1. 12-16; p. 22,1. 23-25; p. 23,1. 1-
10) (Exhibit 1 Hearing Tests). 
7. That on or about August 22, 1994, the State of Utah, by and through the Attorney 
General's Office, procured an Order of Contempt as against Mr. Hall finding that he was in 
arrears as to his child support obligation in the sum of $9,900.00. (R. 177). 
8. That prior to March 25, 1995, Mr. Hall was aware that Ms. Hall was on welfare 
assistance from the State of Utah and that she was evicted from her apartment, and Mr. Hall 
assisted Ms. Hall in moving her furniture to his warehouse. (R. 177, Transcript p. 19,1. 11-23; p. 
20,1 15-25). 
9. That Mr. Hall had knowledge that Ms. Hall was homeless, unemployed, and that 
she had no income during 1995. (R. 177). 
10. That on or about March 25, 1995, Mr. Hall filed an affidavit and motion alleging 
that he should be awarded the care, custody and control of the three minor children. (R. 177). 
11. That pursuant to the affidavit and motion, Mr. Hall further alleged that Ms Hall 
was earning $1,300.00 per month and that Mr. Hall earned $1,667.00 per month. (R. 177). 
12. That based on Mr. Hall's fraudulent allegations, on June 12, 1995, the above-
entitled Court issued an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce requiring Ms. Hall to pay child 
support in the sum of $291.00 per month. (R. 177). 
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13. That Ms. Hall did not have an attorney at the time of the divorce or at the time the 
Decree of Divorce was modified. (R. 177). 
14. That Ms. Hall never received any documents from Mr. Hall as to the child support 
amount which Ms. Hall was ordered to pay. (R. 177). 
15. That just prior to Mr. Hall filing his Petition to take custody of the children in 
April of 1995, Mr. Hall moved Ms. Hall's furniture into his warehouse, took custody of the 
children, and had knowledge that Ms. Hall had drug problems and that she had been charged 
with possession of a controlled substance. (R. 205, Transcript p. 20,1. 8-10). 
16. That Mr. Hall, in an Affidavit dated April 25, 1995, stated that Ms. Hall was 
found by the Sheriff in a semiconscious state, having convulsions. (R. 82-83). 
17. That Ms. Hall had no knowledge about the fact that she had been ordered to pay 
child support until 2001. (R. 205, Transcript p. 21,1. 5-16). 
18. That Ms. Hall has never been served with an Order to Show Cause as to any claim 
for support and no judgments have ever been granted for support. (R. 205, Transcript p. 21,1. 5-
13). 
19. That Mr. Hall in his Answer and Counterclaim requested that he be granted a 
judgment for $25,000.00. (R. 131). That Mr. Hall failed to produce any evidence at trial as to the 
Counterclaim. (R. 205, Transcript p. 41,1. 13-24). 
20. That Ms. Hall filed a Reply to Petitioner's Counterclaim for $25,000.00 denying 
that she owed any sums to Mr. Hall. (R. 132). 
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That based on the Counterclaim and Reply thereto, the issue of a child support 
Hall requesting judgment was one of the issues to be determined by the Court. (R. 
Following trial, the District Court ruled: 
It is my judgment that by clear and convincing evidence, at the time 
of the first modification of this divorce matter on June 12th of 1995, the 
defendant-respondent did not earn $1,300.00 per month as claimed. Indeed, 
at said time, the defendant was on welfare, had received no support, as 
ordered, from the plaintiff pursuant to the decree of December the 2nd 
of 1991, was evicted, all of which was known to the plaintiff because he 
stored her furniture and helped her move. 
Hence, the claimed arrears are illusory and the product of a fraud 
on this Court. They are thus set aside. At the time of the modification 
referred to, the defendant was earning nothing; hence, no support was owed. 
(R. 205, Transcript p. 41,1. 13-24). 
23. That the Court in its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce further stated: 
That the provision requiring Respondent to pay child support in the 
sum of $219.00 per month pursuant to the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
dated June 12, 1995, is determined to be void and terminated and no child 
support is owed by Respondent to Petitioner from June 12, 1995, the date of 
the modification, through June 17, 2002. 
(R. 189). 
24. That Mr. Hall made multiple misrepresentations at trial and failed to bring 
subpoenaed documents such as tax returns, bank statements, and a list of assets and debts to 
support his claims. (Transcript p. 8,1. 1-25; p. 9,1. 5-25; p. 10,1. 1-25; p. 11,1. 1-25; p. 12,1. 1-
25; p. 13,1. 1-25; p. 24,1. 1-25; p. 15,1. 1-13). 
25. That Mr. Hall's misrepresentations came to light after admitting owning assets 
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, paying debts of $3,700.00 per month, and paying all 
claim by Mr. 
131-132). 
22. 
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other living expenses, by testifying that he takes $2,000.00 or $3,000.00 out of his business when 
he needs something, but not on a monthly basis. (R. 205, p. 16,1. 5-23). 
Summary of Argument: 
I. Mr. Hall has not even attempted to challenge the trial court's findings relating to 
its determination to set aside the 1995 Order Modifying Decree. Consequently, 
those findings are presumed to be correct and supported by the record. Those 
undisputed/unchallenged findings adequately support the court's ruling in this 
case. 
II. Mr. Hall failed to raise any due process claim before the trial court; accordingly, 
that issue is waived. Notwithstanding that, Mr. Hall's Counterclaim alleging 
child support arrearages put that issue squarely before the court, and the 
undisputed evidence before the court was that the prior order relating to the child 
support award was procured by misrepresentation or fraud. 
III. Mr. Hall likewise failed to raise any claim that the trial court was barred from 
modifying its previous order, even when such order was based on 
misrepresentation or fraud. Consequently, Mr. Hall cannot raise such claim for 
the first time on appeal. Moreover, Rule 60(b) explicitly provides that the court 
can "set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
IV. In the event that Ms. Hall prevails in this appeal, she should be awarded attorney 
fees and costs. 
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ARGUMENT 
L MR. HALL FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND THEREFORE INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE COURT'S LEGAL DETERMINATIONS. 
Initially, Mr. Hall fails to even acknowledge that the lower court made considerable 
findings relating to its determination to set aside its previous order based on misrepresentation or 
fraud. This court has explicitly held that in order to: 
successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, [a]n appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.' 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting InRe Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 
885, 886) (Utah 1989). 
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to review the accuracy 
of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
In the instant case, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 
1. That prior to March 25, 1995, Petitioner was aware that Respondent was on welfare 
assistance from the State of Utah and that she was evicted from her apartment, and Petitioner 
assisted Respondent in moving her furniture to his warehouse. (R. 177). 
2. That on or about March 25, 1995, Petitioner filed an affidavit and motion alleging 
that he should be awarded the care, custody and control of the three minor children. (R. 177). 
3. That pursuant to the affidavit and motion, Petitioner further alleged that Respondent 
was earning $1,300.00 per month and that Petitioner earned $1,667.00 per month. (R. 177). 
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4. That based on Petitioner's fraudulent allegations, on June 12, 1995, the above 
entitled Court issued an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce requiring Respondent to pay child 
support in the sum of $291.00 per month. (R. 177). 
5. That Petitioner had knowledge that Respondent was homeless, unemployed and that 
she had no income during 1995. (R. 177). 
6. That Respondent has a hearing disability and had basically no income between June 
12, 1995, the date of the modification, until June of 2002, at which time she commenced earning 
$350.00 per month cleaning houses. (R. 177). 
7. That Respondent subpoenaed Petitioner ordering him to bring with him to the trial in 
this matter certain income verification, i.e., tax returns, bank statements, and a list of assets and 
liabilities. (R. 177). 
8. That Petitioner failed to provide said documents to Respondent's counsel or to the 
Court. (R. 177). 
9. That Petitioner testified that he is paying obligations on real property, automobiles, 
boats, etc., totaling $3,700.00 per month, and in addition to said obligations, Petitioner has 
other normal monthly living expenses, including but not restricted to food, utilities, clothing, 
insurance, etc. (R. 177). 
10. That Respondent testified that she owns no automobile and no real property, and 
the only asset she owns is the furniture, furnishings and personal items which Petitioner placed in 
his warehouse in 1995 and which he has refused to return to Respondent for a period of 
approximately eight years, despite repeated requests by Respondent. (R. 177). 
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Here, Mr. Hall has not even attempted to marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
forgoing findings in an effort to show that there was insufficient evidence to support such 
findings at trial. Consequently, this court must presume that all of the findings were supported by 
the evidence and only determine whether the trial court appropriately applied the law to the 
findings in this case. Saunders 806 P.2d at 199. 
II. INASMUCH AS MR. HALL FILED A COUNTERCLAIM SEEKING 
JUDGMENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES AGAINST MS. 
HALL, ANY ISSUE RELATING TO THAT CLAIM WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT; THEREFORE MR. HALL WAS NOT 
DENIED ANY RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS. 
Mr. Hall claims that he was denied some right of due process because the issue of fraud 
was not pleaded. Specifically, he claims that he was not afforded timely notice of that issue, 
citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). Such argument is wholly without 
merit. First, Mr. Hall raises his due process claim for the first time on appeal. It is well settled 
that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This 
includes constitutional issues. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
Moreover, it is well established that "fraud upon the court may be raised by [a] court sua 
sponte." Kellev v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 186 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting 12 James W. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice sec. 60.21 [4][f] (3d ed.1997). At the trial court, Mr. Hall filed a 
counterclaim seeking child support arrearages: 
from the time that the Petitioner was awarded the care and custody of the minor 
children of the parties and the respondent was ordered to pay a sum of $291.00 
per month for and as child support from May 1995, she has failed to pay and owes 
the petitioner a sum of approximately $25,000.00. 
(R. 131). 
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By doing so, Mr. Hall put the arrearage issue square before the trial court; consequently, 
when Ms. Hall introduced considerable evidence that Mr. Hall had procured the prior order by 
outright misrepresentation or fraud and Mr. Hall presented no evidence countering the same, the 
trial court correctly and on its own accord dismissed the Mr. Hall's counterclaim and vacated the 
1995 order as it related to support, ruling that "the claimed arrears are illusory and the product of 
a fraud on this court. They are thus set aside." 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT, BASED ON "CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE" BEFORE IT, APPROPRIATELY SET ASIDE THE 
COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDER WHICH WAS PROCURED BY 
MISREPRESENTATION OR FRAUD. 
Mr. Hall next claims that the trial court was without authority to modify its previous order 
based on misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall. Specifically, Mr. Hall claims that Ms. Hall was 
barred by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure from maintaining any action for fraud. 
Once again Mr. Hall raises this issue for the first time on appeal; consequently, this court should 
decline to address his claim. Monson vs. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
Furthermore, Mr. Hall utterly fails to recognize the explicit language in Rule 60(b) stating that 
the court can set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
Mr. Hall also argues that any claim for fraud by Ms. Hall must be initiated by a separate 
or independent action. This claim likewise fails. In the present case, fraud had not been plead by 
either party, however, after taking considerable evidence and making uncontroverted findings, 
the District Court concluded that Mr. Hall had indeed committed a fraud on the court in 1995. 
"Fraud upon the court may be raised by the court sua sponte and an appeals court may 
14 
vacate a lower court decree on this ground." Kelley v. Kelley. 9 P.3d. 171,186 (Utah App. 2000) 
(citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.. 
322 U.S. 238, (1944) acknowledged the "tension between the rule that judgments are final and 
the rule of equity that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief 
will be granted." Id. at 244. "This equitable rule was fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized 
need for correcting injustices." M. "It should be exercised cautiously, but when the occasion 
demands, the power has been wielded without hesitation and equity can be interposed to 
devitalize judgments." Id- at 245. "Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the 
judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands 
that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless 
victims of deception and fraud." Toscano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 441 F.2d 930, 
935 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted). In this case, therefore, the trial court, after considering all 
of the evidence before it, and after entering findings which have not been challenged on appeal, 
appropriately concluded, sua sponte, that there had indeed been a fraud upon the court. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-5(3) affords the trial court continuing jurisdiction to 
modify orders and decrees in divorce matters. Specifically, that section provides that "[the 
district court] has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care . . ." In Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court held that: 
where respondent did not have accurate information about appellant's income at 
the time she executed the stipulation, the trial court did not err in modifying its 
prior order based on that stipulation. A party may not obtain a stipulation based 
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on a misrepresentation or material omission of facts and later claim that a child 
support order cannot be modified . . . 
Id. at 1346. 
The reasoning in Gates applies to the case at bar. Here, Mr. Hall does not challenge the 
court's findings that he knew that Ms. Hall was homeless, unemployed and that she had no 
income during 1995 when he filed a Petition to Modify and a supporting affidavit alleging that 
she had income of $1,300.00 per month and thereby was awarded child support in the amount of 
$291.00 per month. Based on that and other uncontroverted findings and the rationale in Gates, 
the District Court had the authority to modify its previous default order where such order was 
undisputedly based on an outright misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall. 
IV. MS, HALL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL, 
Ms. Hall seeks attorney fees for responding to this appeal. It is well settled "in divorce 
actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on 
the main issues, [this court] generally award[s] fees on appeal." Elman v. Elman. 45 P.3d 176 
(Utah App. 2002) (quoting Rosendahl v. RosendahL 876 P.2d 870, 875) (Utah App. 1994). In 
this case, Ms. Hall was awarded fees at trial in the sum of $3,335.70 (R.190); accordingly, in the 
event that she prevails here, she would likewise be entitled to fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the District Court properly set aside the 1995 Order relating to 
child support based on misrepresentation or fraud by Mr. Hall. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's appeal 
should be dismissed and attorney fees and costs for appeal should be awarded to Ms. Hall. 
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DATED this ^ d a y of April, 2004. 
^^OLAN J. OLSE 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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